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Abstract
Introduction: Certain real life applications of  scientific and social science ideas that knowingly reject accumulated empirical 
biomedical evidence have been termed ‘pseudoscience,’ or empirical rejectionism. An uncritical acceptance of  empiricism, or 
even of  evidence-based medicine, however, can also be problematic.
Objectives: With reference to a specific type of  medical denialism associated with moral failure, justified by dissident AIDS and 
anti-vaccine scientific publications, this paper seeks to make the argument that this type of  denialism meets certain longstanding 
definitions for classification as pseudoscience.
Methods: This paper uses a conceptual framework to make certain arguments and to juxtapose arguments for evidence-based 
approaches to medicine against literature that highlights certain limitations of  an unquestioning approach to empiricism.  
Results: Discussions of  certain real life examples are used to derive the important insight that, under certain conditions, moral 
failure can result in the violation both Type I and Type II scientific error types, with catastrophic consequences.
Conclusion: It is argued that the validity of  all theory should not be assumed before sufficient empirical evidence has accu-
mulated to support its validity across contexts. However, caution is required, to avoid the consequences of  an unquestioning 
approach to empiricism.
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Introduction
Certain emergent problems with potentially catastrophic 
consequences require medical responses in a matter of  
hours, or days. Examples of  these include outbreaks of  
Zika1, Ebola2, Lassa3, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
(MERS-CoV)4, swine flu/H1N15, or rapidly increasing 
global antibiotic resistance6. To meet these challeng-
es, healthcare professionals require up to date scientific 
knowledge. It is not enough that this knowledge is up 
to date. It also needs to be scientifically rigorous. A re-
liance on empirical evidence and rigor, however, should 
not be confounded with a dogmatic faith in empiricism 
itself, which can also be problematic7-9. In light of  this 
tension, between a need for a pragmatic approach to ev-
idence-based medicine (EBM), and the dangers of  an 
uncritical acceptance of  EBM, amidst uncertainties asso-
ciated with its shortcomings, this paper seeks to provide 
a discussion of  these issues, and to derive cautionary rec-
ommendations for those exposed to these same issues. 
In doing so,dissident examples of  AIDS10,11 and vaccine 
denialism12-18 are employed as an interpretive schema, or 
lens, through which to view events that link dissident per-
spectives in scientific publication to harmful outcomes. 
Such an approach offers a useful heuristic in order to 
highlight a certain type of  harmful use of  science, which, 
according to established literature19, has previously been 
categorised as ‘pseudoscience.’ These examples are taken 
to represent pseudoscience in medicine, which is defined 
here as scientific denialism associated with moral failure, 
justifying itself  in terms of  dissident scientific publica-
tion in order to advance agendas with the potential to 
do medical harm to human populations. According to 
Kuhn20, [with the exception of  extraordinary problems] 
the “three classes of  problems-determination of  signif-
icant fact, matching of  facts with theory, and articula-
tion of  theory-exhaust, I think, the literature of  normal 
science, both empirical and theoretical (p.34).” Medical 
pseudoscience, as discussed here, falls outside of  Kuhn’s 
classes of  problem.
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This definition of  medical pseudoscience is derived 
here,specifically, from two examples. The first relates to 
the moral failure on the part of  a government, associ-
ated with AIDS denialism, which justified its medically 
harmfulactions at the time on the basis of  certain dis-
sident scientific publications11. The policy stance in this 
case persisted, for years, after the emergence of  evidence 
of  the large scale loss of  human life caused by these ac-
tions. The second example relates to the emergence of  
the anti-vaccination movement, based on the publication 
of  two scientific papers in particular12,13, which mooted 
a causal relationship between measles-mumps-rubella 
(MMR) vaccination and autism. This movement has also 
been linked to an increase in fatalities due to non-vacci-
nation18. 
Through the use of  a heuristic, in the form of  the inter-
pretive schema offered by these two examples, a textured 
discussion of  the dangers of  medical pseudoscience is 
provided here. The problems of  dogmatic empiricism are 
also, however, highlighted, to demonstrate the pervasive-
ness of  medical pseudoscience as a problem that cannot 
be simplistically argued away with reference to notions of  
scientific evidence. 
In light of  the problem of  medical pseudoscience, the 
objective of  this paper is to inform those potentially 
affected by the phenomena discussed here, and to pro-
vide cautionary insights on the basis of  a considered en-
gagement with the literature. Given recent literature that 
highlights the vulnerability of  the scientific publication 
process to political and ideological agendas21, it is import-
ant to note, up front, that science itself  is also subject to 
agendas of  power20,22,23, and that an empirical approach to 
solving these problems of  medical denialism cannot also 
be considered to be value free or more just than other, 
non-empirical approaches.
Indeed, although some have argued that political con-
servatives in the US have been prone to deny scientific 
evidence related to climate change, recent evidence finds 
that scientific denialism may characterise those both on 
the left and the right of  the political spectrum21. If  no 
political denomination at this time has a monopoly on 
dissident, or anti-science, discourse, the arguments made 
in this paper are perhaps timely, and serve to provide 
cautionary insights, particularly for those at the nexus of  
ideological and political forces, where scientific work, and 
particularly empirical findings, might be vulnerable to im-
moral misrepresentation. It is argued here that the use 
of  the term pseudoscience, albeit uncomfortable, might 
therefore be useful (or even necessary), in that such un-
comfortable debates may be to the benefit of  those most 
vulnerable and powerless in the face of  medical need.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The need for a cautionary 
perspective on empiricism is first introduced. To further 
contextualise the discussions, the topic of  medical nihil-
ism is then also introduced. Certain challenges associated 
with the notion of  consensus are then considered, and 
discrepancies between published recommendations and 
clinical practice are then discussed. Finally, consideration 
of  the topics of  medical denialism and academic pseudo-
science round off  the paper, and the conclusion section 
summarises its objective and its key arguments. 
The need for a cautionary perspective on empiricism 
Unwarranted faith in empiricism can amount to little 
more than dogma. It must be acknowledged that here is 
little in the way of  evidence to date that demonstrates 
that an empirical approach can eliminate the dangers 
inherent in human interpretation and subjectivity. The 
pervasiveness of  medical denialism14-18, and well-known 
historical cases, such as the rejection of  Semmelweiss’s 
empirical evidence of  how to reduce infections in sur-
gicalprocedures24, seem to highlight this problem. The 
discussions of  medical pseudoscience undertaken here 
therefore need to be grounded in an acknowledgement 
of  the limitations of  empiricism itself. The problem of  
medical nihilism, according to Poland17, highlights seem-
ingly insoluble problems associated withhuman choices 
to believe or disbelieve medical evidence. 
Medical nihilism
An important debatein the literature relates to discus-
sions of  medical nihilism. The McKeown Thesis derives 
from McKeown’s argument that in certain contexts the 
fall in the crude mortality rate over time was largely “due 
not to life-saving advancements in the field of  medicine 
or public health, but instead to improvements in overall 
standards of  living (p.725),” and especially those relat-
ed to advances in nutrition that resulted from improved 
economic conditions25. Debates about McKeown’s thesis 
have persisted in light of  the question, are “public health 
ends better served by targeted interventions or by broad-
based efforts to redistribute the social, political, and eco-
nomic resources that determine the health of  popula-
tions? (p.725)”25. 
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The McKeown thesis has, however, led to what some 
have termed medical health nihilism26, whereby some 
(perhaps “an entire generation of  social scientists, histo-
rians, and policymakers”) have considered the contribu-
tions of  economics and nutrition to overshadow the role 
of  public health interventions (p.1014)27. While some, for 
example, have questioned the provision of  treatment for 
multi-drug resistant tuberculosis,in certain contexts, in 
that it may not be cost effective, Farmer and Nardell27 
stress that it is important to avoid the trap of  medical 
health nihilism, in that even though poverty and inequal-
ity persist, it is necessary to, nevertheless, “move forward 
with focused interventions and insist on universal access 
to high-quality TB care (p1015).” 
Problematic consensus
Consensus about medical phenomena, can, however, be 
problematic under certain conditions. According to so-
cial empiricism, consensus is typically epistemologically 
undesirable (Solomon, 2001). Dissent is valuable, even 
when there is no discussion (because deliberation can 
sometimes “make things worse rather than better”), as it 
does not require discussion to make it valuable, as orig-
inally argued by the likes of  Mill, Popper and Longino 
(p.38)7. 
An over-reliance on the dogma of  empiricism might 
therefore open scientific endeavour up to the shortcom-
ings of  problematic forms of  consensus. EBM, based 
on the work of  clinical epidemiologists in the 1970s 
and 1980s, emerged as a “new paradigm” at the start of  
the 1990s, associated with methods such as randomised 
controlled trials, systematic reviews, and meta-analyses, 
which produced “an extensive and powerful body of  re-
search (p.451)”9. Relying heavily on statistics, probability 
theory and utility theory provide EBM with its concep-
tual underpinnings. With its hierarchy of  evidence, EBM 
takes its epistemic techniques as superior to traditional 
methods such as expert opinion, clinical experience, and 
physiological reasoning. This stance has not gone unchal-
lenged, however. 
Indeed, Solomon9 stresses that EBM has been described 
as a Kuhnian paradigm, and that it has been criticised in 
terms of  its procedural aspects28,29, in terms of  its falli-
bility, or its lack of  replicability30, and its incompleteness 
as a philosophy of  science. In terms of  the latter, there 
has been a persistent criticism of  EBM that it ignores 
the basic sciences that inform research and clinical prac-
tice, whereby it is “scientifically superficial: it measures 
correlations,” failing to “theorize about the complete or-
ganism, still less the complete organism in its social and 
environmental context (p.462)”9.
Further, according to Solomon9, literature suggests that 
“publication bias, time to publication bias and pharma-
ceutical funding bias (which subtly affects trial design and 
evaluation) are responsible for the worse-than-expected 
track record” of  random controlled trials, systematic re-
views, and meta-analyses (p.460). Considering these crit-
icisms, Solomon suggests an instrumental, or pragmatic 
approach, whereby evidence should be ranked with refer-
ence to actual (and not theoretically expected) reliability 
of  results. 
According to Solomon9, with the “recent emphasis on 
translational medicine, we are seeing a restoration of  the 
recognition that clinical research requires an engagement 
with basic theory (e.g. physiological, genetic, biochemi-
cal) and a range of  empirical techniques,” in that EBM 
“works best when used in this context (p.460).” Transla-
tional medicine seeks to develop interdisciplinary syner-
gies between researchers, and to create interactive linkag-
es between basic science research and research in clinical 
medicine. Translational medicine might ultimately hold 
the key to reducing problems associated with discrep-
ancies between published recommendations and clinical 
practices. 
Discrepancies between published recommendations 
and clinical practices
Much work in other fields draws on precedent in medical 
research, in order to follow a systematic process, so as to 
develop evidence-informed knowledge31. Thus medical 
science is acknowledged to lead the way in evidence-based 
research, notwithstanding the problems associated with 
dogmatic approaches to empiricism. 
Research on medical practice patterns has revealed a dis-
crepancy between “published recommendations and clin-
ical practices”32. According to Bryg and Johns32:
The emotional appeal of  interventional therapy is often 
so strong that rational thought is denied…Physicians 
and patients often feel better trying “something” rath-
er than waiting; interventional procedures are powerful 
and seductive for those seeking action….Many different 
factors can be given to explain differences between clin-
ical practices and recommendations based on controlled 
trials. The current efforts to address the medicolegal sys-
tem and remuneration may not be enough. To change the 
“art’ of  medicine through the “science’ of  randomized 
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trials, attention to all of  these issues is needed to change 
practice patterns and help us “practice what we preach 
(p.1309).”  
Seminal theory also points to how discrepancies be-
tween published recommendations and clinical practices. 
The seminal work of  Kuhn20 predicts that paradigmatic 
change can occur in scientific research, but that research-
ers typically reject novel facts that do not conform to the 
assumptions and values associated with a particular par-
adigm. In light of  the potential consequences of  pseu-
doscience, this paper seeks to explore the central tenet 
of  Kuhn’s work, that advances in science are subject to 
changes in human values systems and not only to the ob-
jective advances of  science itself, in relation to examples 
of  how evidence can be ignored, at great human cost. By 
making these relationships explicit, we might be less likely 
to repeat the mistakes of  the past.  
Kuhn’s theory suggests that advances in science are es-
sentially a function of  how the values and beliefs of  
scientists in fields change, whereby in ‘normal science’ 
fields will typically resist paradigmatic change in the face 
of  contrary evidence, until eventually a tipping point is 
reached, and sets of  values and beliefs then change to 
accommodate the new paradigm. Kuhn’s theory can be 
used to draw useful inferences, particularly when applied 
to the phenomenon of  ‘pseudoscience’ and its potentially 
harmful influence. 
As discussed, a powerful example of  Kuhn’s theory in the 
medical context is the work of  Semmelweiss. The case 
of  Semmelweiss24 illustrates how professionals can reject 
innovative ideas even in the face of  evidence of  the cata-
strophic human costs associated with this rejection. Sem-
melweiss, a doctor in the 1800s, demonstrated dramat-
ically lower surgical mortality rates due to handwashing 
using a chloride of  lime solution. Even after providing 
evidence of  this life saving process, his ideas were reject-
ed. It was only two decades later that his work was revis-
ited by the medical profession24, and the ‘new paradigm’ 
of  sterile hand washing was embraced. 
Other seminal work, for example by Lakatos33 also stress-
es the subjectivity of  the research process, as fields like 
Newtonian Physics were shown to have rejected novel 
facts that challenged the ‘hard core,’ or fundamental te-
nets of  the field. This work can also be taken to support 
Kuhn’s arguments that it cannot always be assumed that 
objective evidence will be the basis for how scientific de-
cisions are made. 
There are other examples of  Kuhn’s theory at work in the 
social sciences. Events such as the Sokal affair, orSokal 
hoax34 have highlighted the vulnerability of  the academy 
to empirical rejectionism, or rejection of  evidence-based 
approaches in academic or scientific research, or pseu-
doscience. Still and Dryden35 suggest two types of  pseu-
doscience, one related to academic fields entailing deep 
engagement with some kind of  academic process, termed 
‘big’ pseudoscience, and one related to ‘erroneous’ public 
beliefs, with less of  a deep engagement in academia, but 
often with a tenacious grip on the beliefs of  many within 
populations. A core argument presented in this paper is 
that, as predicted by Kuhn’s theory, professional medical 
work, including policymaking, requires constant vigilance 
on the part of  medical professionals so as to avoid the 
influence of  pseudoscience.   
Pseudoscience in the form of  medical denialism 
The examples of  AIDS and vaccine denialism might be 
a useful interpretive schema, or lens, through which to 
view events that link dissident perspectives in scientific 
publication to harmful outcomes. As stressed previously, 
science is also an agenda of  power20,22,23, and an empirical 
approach to solving these problems of  medical denialism 
therefore cannot also be considered to be value free or 
more just than other, non-empirical approaches. 
Nattrass11 summarises certain catastrophic events at the 
nexus of  pseudoscience, political power, and moral fail-
ure on a national scale:
AIDS policy in post-apartheid South Africa has been 
shaped by persistent antipathy towards antiretroviral 
drugs (ARVs). This hostility was framed initially by [the 
president’s] questioning of  AIDS science and subse-
quently by direct resistance to implementing prevention 
and treatment programmes using ARVs. Once that battle 
was lost in the courts and in the political arena, the health 
minister [at the time] continued to portray ARVs as ‘poi-
son’ and to support alternative untested therapies. Demo-
graphic modelling suggests that if  the national govern-
ment had used ARVs for prevention and treatment at the 
same rate as the Western Cape (which defined national 
policy on ARVs), then about 171,000 HIV infections and 
343,000 deaths could have been prevented between 1999 
and 2007. Two key scientific bodies, the Medicines Con-
trol Council (MCC) and the Medical Research Council 
(MRC) fall under the ambit of  the national Department 
of  Health. Although notionally independent, both have 
experienced political interference as a consequence of  
their scientific approach towards AIDS (p.157). 
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This example is illustrative, offering useful insights into 
a paradoxical situation of  power misuse that led to the 
deaths of  many who were the most vulnerable and pow-
erless. This paradox seems to mirror the anti-science dis-
course driven by politicians in current political discourse, 
whether relating to the denial of  climate change, or the 
selective use of  science in support of  political agendas 
(for a useful summary of  these current issues, see Wash-
burn and Skitka21). Given the hundreds of  thousands that 
may have died due to the amoral implementation of  po-
litical ideology in the case of  South Africa, describing this 
using the term ‘medical pseudoscience’ is perhaps neces-
sary (uncomfortable as the term may be to the academic 
ear), so as to not do disservice to those that have perished 
due to the application of  this particular type of  scientific 
denialism. Indeed, it would seem that such events pass 
out of  consideration relatively quickly, both by the pub-
lic and by academic discussions. Those involved in this 
perpetration live on, with little in the way of  account-
ability. This example seems to illustrate a unique form of  
pseudoscience, which bears classification as such, and the 
development of  its own stream of  literature.Exploring 
this paradox is useful, as it can offer insights into tensions 
between science and agendas of  power. Further explora-
tion of  this example offers more detailed insights into the 
harm that pseudoscience can cause. 
The use of  this particular example might also serve to 
highlight the differences between pseudoscience and 
discourse that highlights legitimate criticisms of  evi-
dence-based approaches to medicine. This particular 
form of  pseudoscience is taken here to relate to the pow-
er relationships of  political actors and the prioritisation 
of  ideology, in such a way as to actively engage in empir-
ical rejectionism, at the expense of  the most vulnerable 
and powerless in a society. 
An important lesson can be learned from these events. 
This large scale loss of  human life was found to be due 
to scientific denialism on the part of  certain respect-
ed academics. According to Nattrass11 the cause can be 
traced back to the publication of  scientific research, as 
accomplished (highly respected at the time) academics 
argued that AZT itself  caused AIDS rather than treating 
or preventing it. An example of  the link between these 
events and scientific publication is Duesberg’s10. Denialist 
members of  the Presidential AIDS Advisory panel (half  
orthodox scientists, half  AIDS denialists) asserted that 
“AIDS would disappear instantaneously if  all HIV testing 
was outlawed and the use of  antiretroviral drugs was ter-
minated (p.162)11. Another example of  this type of  pseu-
doscience, in the form of  medical denialism, or empirical 
rejectionism, is the spread of  the anti-vaccine movement. 
The link between dissident academic publication and the 
rise of  the pseudoscientific anti-vaccine movement is also 
seen in the emergence of  the populist anti-vaccine move-
ment, which advocated halting MMR immunisation18. 
This example of  vaccine nihilism, according to Poland17, 
highlights the problem that “there are no magical solu-
tions to the deep divide between those who accept the 
scientific method and evidence and those who do not 
and simply choose to disbelieve the evidence (p.1).” This 
movement emerged on account of  scientific publications 
that put forth the thesis that MMR vaccine was linked 
with the development of  autism12,13. This example also 
serves to highlight the dangers of  denialism, and its po-
tential human costs14-16. 
Policy applications of  pseudoscientific ideas and ideol-
ogies, including economic ideas, and the human costs 
of  these are beyond the scope of  this work, but further 
study of  examples like this by further research might be 
instructive. This example clearly highlights Kuhn’s20  pre-
dictions, challenging assumptions that empirical rejec-
tionist behaviour is necessarily benign.
Resistance to scientific thought itself  has a long history. 
Contestations between empirical rejectionist belief  sys-
tems and science, and the catastrophic costs in human life 
caused by belief-system resistance to science throughout 
history is well documented38. Following Kuhn20, a condi-
tion for scientific advancement seems to be its coinciden-
tal alignment or convenient instrumental value for power-
ful agendas. In contrast to South African AIDS denialism 
in the context of  a developing nation, the anti-vaccine 
movement serves as a cautionary tale about the perva-
siveness of  pseudoscientific beliefs in developed nations. 
Academic literature on pseudoscience may offer further 
insights into these discussions. 
Academic pseudoscience
Seeking to define prevalence of  pseudoscience in the 
psychology discipline, Lilienfeld19 suggests that academ-
ics follow Bunge’s seven ‘indicators of  pseudoscience’ for 
guidance. These include: (i) overuse of  ad hoc hypotheses 
to avoid refutation, (ii) emphasising confirmation, above 
refutation, (iii) lack of  self-correction, (iv) reversed bur-
den of  proof, (v) excessive reliance on testimonial and 
anecdotal evidence, (vi) use of  obscurantist language, and 
(7) lack of  connectivity with other disciplines. The use 
of  science to justify the objectives of  the AIDS denialist 
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state, and the objectives of  the anti-vaccine movement 
are considered to warrant the term ‘pseudoscience’ as 
they seem to meet these criteria. More than this, these 
examples offer examples of  moral failure that seem to 
require differentiation from other instances of  conflict 
with empiricism. 
Thus, it is arguably useful to differentiate these examples 
by using the term pseudoscience, so as not to confound 
their discussion with broader debates on empiricism it-
self. It is therefore important to provide an informed dis-
cussion that embraces these broader debates, and which 
locates these two examples of  a specific form of  pseu-
doscience in relation to debates on empiricism, and the 
weaknesses of  dogmatic empiricism as a potential rem-
edy for the problem of  denialist pseudoscience. To un-
derstand the real threats of  pseudoscience it is perhaps 
necessary to return to first principles.
An example of  this kind of  ‘first principle’ can perhaps 
be found in the doctrine ‘do no harm.’ With reference 
to the field of  psychology, which has no equivalent of  
the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA’s) oversight 
function, Lilienfeld19 stresses the importance of  the med-
ical and mental health professions’ credo primum non 
nocere, or ‘first, do no harm.’ The harm associated with 
pseudoscience is well illustrated in light of  the examples 
considered above. 
The tensions between unlimited thought in academic 
contexts (which are good) and opportunistic use of  ideas 
for political or ideological reasons that are largely insepa-
rable from issues of  power use and abuse, which can lead 
to loss of  human life (which are bad) are not indepen-
dent of  real life contexts informed by medical science. A 
conceptual framework is needed in order to better under-
stand these tensions. 
According to Solomon7, from “the work of  historians of  
science, sociologists of  science, anthropologists of  sci-
ence, feminist critics, social psychologists and decision 
analysts, we now know much more about the variety and 
pervasiveness of  bias,” whereby no one “has designed a 
group (or individual) scientific practice in which bias is 
eliminated, or even reduced to insignificant levels (p.169).” 
Solomon’s7 work has sought to offer scientists a heuristic 
based on decision vectors, or the decisions that are made 
to accept one theory over another, particularly when both 
offer overlapping predictions about phenomena, or where 
both seem to fit the available data. These decision vectors 
can be based on empirical data or conceptual rationales. 
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Arguably, the wellspring for most pseudoscientific ideas 
has been academia. As well it is expected to be, given ac-
ademic freedom and the role of  the academy in generat-
ing all types of  ideas, without limit. How do we then dif-
ferentiate theory from recommendations for healthcare 
practice? Figure 1 offers a model, with the hope that it 
might be a useful heuristic for understanding the tensions 
between the two scientific error states, namely between 
making a Type 1 error of  rejecting a true novel finding, 
versus making a Type II error of  failing to reject false 
novel findings. These representations acknowledge the 
criticisms of  empiricism highlighted in previous sections, 
and relate only to discussions of  the tensions between 
theorising and empirically testing theory. 
In health sciences research, the centre line (in bold) 
shown in Figure 1 represents the optimal state, where the 
types of  errors are balanced. This, in many studies, is put 
at the 95% confidence threshold, where statistical testing 
is at the five percent level of  significance. As we know, 
however, this value is arbitrary, as increasing the size of  a 
sample can increase the chances of  obtaining a significant 
effect. A health science practitioner or researcher, how-
ever, needs to navigate between modes in different roles. 
As a theorist, one might need to be open to all ideas, and 
to consider all potentialities. To theorise innovatively, one 
would need to sacrifice validity temporarily, to develop 
models that can then be tested for validity.  
Dissident theory that predicted that HIV was caused by 
ARVs, for example, is an example falling into the low va-
lidity portion of  the continuum shown in Figure 1. How-
ever, so should all health theory that has not been em-
pirically tested, in some way. This example is useful as a 
special case, however, in that it represents the extreme of  
Type 1 error, whereby these scientists rejected accumu-
lated evidence that clearly supported the use of  ARVs. A 
Type II error, however, is also evident, in that there was a 
failure to reject theory that was patently at odds with the 
accumulated evidence to date. The model shown in Fig-
ure 1 is only useful in that it identifies problems related to 
validity versus problems related to conservatism and lack 
of  innovation, but it does not show that at the extremes, 
both the violation of  Type 1 and Type II errors can con-
verge. The example of  AIDS denialism illustrates that it 
is important for a healthcare practitioner to understand 
that there is not simply one continuum of  error that can 
be made, but that both kinds of  errors can mirror each 
other at the extreme. 
Whereas many have discussed the example of  Semmel-
weiss24, this instance of  a Type I error has seemingly not 
to date been considered in relation to an example of  the 
coincidence of  Type 1 and II. This is however evident in 
a government’s refusal to allow treatment of  HIV victims 
with ARVs on the basis of  theory developed by respect-
ed academics. Similarly, while seminal theory byLakatos 
(1970) also stresses how core tenets of  fields can reject 
new knowledge, this theory also relates primarily to Type 
1 errors, as does Kuhn’s20 seminal work. The Sokal hoax34 
highlights the potential for theory to be published by 
respected journals, but which was specifically formulat-
ed on the basis of  confounding logics. Further research 
should differentiate between extreme forms of  Type I 
and Type II error violation. The two forms of  pseudosci-
ence discussed here might be taken to exhibit character-
istics of  these extremes, and that such a characterisation 
might be useful in differentiating them from other forms 
of  medical denialism. 
A contribution of  this paperis arguably in the way it iden-
tifies and highlights dangers associated with the way that 
both Type I and Type II errors can actually be committed 
under certain circumstances. At these extremes, a phe-
nomenon is identified, termed medical pseudoscience, 
a relatively unique form of  pseudoscience that takes the 
form of  extreme denialism, but which is vulnerable to 
those with political agendas or other motives associated 
with moral failure. Knowledge of  this categorisation is 
arguably important, particularly when healthcare pro-
viders and policy makers can be lulled into a false sense 
of  security in deriving policy or practice from dogmat-
ic perspectives of  empiricism that do not acknowledge 
the shortcomings of  empiricism, or EBM itself. Certain 
conclusions and recommendations that derive from this 
analysis are now presented. 
Conclusion
The objective of  this paper was to provide a discussion 
of  the dangers of  medical pseudoscience, which might be 
particularly relevant in a global context wherein anti-sci-
ence, or dissident and denialist discourse, seems to alsobe 
driven by political forces, making such discourse vulnera-
ble to agendas associated with moral failure. 
It is concluded that taking recourse to unquestioning ap-
proaches of  empiricism may however also be wronghead-
ed. Instead, the approach of  Solomon7-9 is recommended, 
one of  cautious pragmatism. More specifically, evidence 
should be ranked with reference to actual (and not theo-
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retically expected) reliability of  results9. Thus, threats as-
sociated with medical nihilism might be mitigated, prag-
matically, to reduce harm. 
In extending debates about dissident and denialist medi-
cal discourse, this work sought to build on other, related, 
work. Such work includes research that highlighting the 
dangers of  inflexible and slow responses to epidemics37, 
a lack of  an adequate bioethical response to novel discov-
eries38, constraints posed by human values to scientific 
progress itself39, and changes to the scientific discovery 
process on account of  emergent technologies40,41. This 
work also sought to extend discussions of  empiricism to 
embrace issues associated with medical pseudoscience.
It is also concluded that these examples of  medical pseu-
doscience might benefit from further research that con-
ceptualises them as extreme forms of  the violation of  
Type 1 and Type II errors, whereby at the extremes, such 
phenomena share epistemic similarities.  
In conclusion, much hope rests on the promise of  trans-
lational medicine9, and its potential to address certain of  
the shortcomings of  empiricism through a more inter-
disciplinary and pluralistic approach to both the meth-
odological and theory-development processes of  medical 
science. Going forward, however, epistemic caution may 
be an important watchword in a world in which political 
forces may increasingly have the power to harnessscien-
tific and medical denialism in pursuit of  ideological agen-
das. 
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